The deliberate targeting of civilians constitutes one of the gravest violations under international law—a categorical red line that no state may cross without undermining the very foundations of the global legal order. Yet, during Operation Sindoor, India’s cross-border strikes against Pakistan’s civilian population transgressed that boundary with calculated intent. Entire families were annihilated, homes razed, and lives extinguished in attacks that were neither dictated by military necessity nor accidental, but deliberate affronts to the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL). These actions were more than breaches of the laws of armed conflict—they represented a fundamental betrayal of India’s own constitutional guarantees of life and dignity. They unfolded under the gaze of an international community whose silence risks morphing into complicity, setting a perilous precedent for the permissibility of civilian targeting in future conflicts.
The protections for civilians in armed conflict are unequivocal. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which India is a party, and their Additional Protocols prohibit direct attacks against civilian populations. Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I is explicit: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)—though not ratified by India—classifies such acts as war crimes under Article 8(2)(b)(i). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, applicable to all armed conflicts, prohibits “violence to life and person” against civilians. By engaging in indiscriminate shelling of residential areas, targeting women and children, and destroying civilian infrastructure, India’s conduct during Operation Sindoor aligns with the legal definition of state terrorism articulated in UNGA Resolution 49/60, which condemns intentional acts designed to intimidate civilian populations.
These violations also stand in direct contradiction to India’s domestic constitutional and treaty-based obligations. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, expansively interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right to dignity and protection from arbitrary state violence. While primarily applicable to Indian citizens, these protections reflect the normative commitments India has undertaken under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—notably, Article 6 on the right to life and Article 7 prohibiting torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. By conducting cross-border strikes on non-combatants, India has not only contravened IHL but has also eroded its own constitutional ethos and international legal standing.
Justice for the victims of Operation Sindoor is both a legal entitlement and a moral imperative. Multiple international mechanisms remain available if pursued with political resolve. Pakistan could bring proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violations of IHL. Complaints to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) could be lodged via its Special Procedures, including the Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Violence Against Women; and Human Rights while Countering Terrorism. The UN Human Rights Committee, which monitors ICCPR compliance, may be engaged in cases where domestic remedies prove ineffective. Under the “Uniting for Peace” framework, the UN General Assembly could recommend collective measures against such acts. Furthermore, while neither India nor Pakistan are ICC States Parties, the ICC could acquire jurisdiction through a UN Security Council referral, as occurred in Darfur.
Such avenues, however, require the dismantling of the international community’s selective approach to accountability. States such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, Japan, and Norway—whose domestic laws condemn state violence against civilians—must apply these standards consistently. Mechanisms like the U.S. Leahy Laws, the UK Human Rights Act, Canada’s Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, and Australia’s Magnitsky-style sanctions framework provide ready-made tools for targeted accountability.
India’s conduct during Operation Sindoor also meets the UNGA’s functional definition of state terrorism: acts intended to cause death or serious injury to civilians for the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling governmental action. The absence of any military necessity suggests these strikes sought not battlefield advantage but the creation of fear, political pressure on Pakistan, and the delivery of a coercive strategic message.
For the victims, these legal classifications are distant abstractions compared to the tangible devastation they endure—the empty chairs at family meals, orphaned children, and the ruins that once housed communities. Women and girls, in particular, bore a disproportionate burden, enduring the compounded effects of armed conflict and gender-based violence. Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), India had an affirmative duty to shield women from such harms. Instead, it became the source of their suffering.
Pakistan’s response must be multidimensional—asserting sovereignty, pursuing sustained diplomatic engagement with key capitals and multilateral fora, presenting incontrovertible evidence, and amplifying the testimonies of survivors to global audiences in Geneva, New York, London, and Washington.