Pakistan’s largest but poorest province, Balochistan, is caught in a complicated insurgency which was fueled again over the last two years. Defined by growing attack on security forces, infrastructure, and economic activity, the violence is as much evidence of insurgent groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS) tactical flexibility as it is an indication of the failure of the state to meet long-term structural grievances. Why the Baloch insurgency is so complicated is because of its political reason — not religious whatsoever, but an outcome of deep-rooted discrimination, economic marginalization, and state failure. The new militancy, exemplified by headline-grabbing activities like the hijacking of the Jaffar Express and frequent attacks on Chinese engineers on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, is a change in strategy among the insurgents.
The Baloch National Army (BNA) of the BRAS, a new alliance, is a fitting one, being an attempt at greater coordination among the groups of insurgencies. The latter, on their part, have resorted to urban terrorism, propaganda warfare, and increasingly brutal operations, e.g., female suicide bombers — a reflection of foreign training as much as local nurturing. Islamabad has credited foreign support to these organizations, i.e., Indian as well as Afghan intelligence agencies.
As much as one wants to exclude foreign aid — think of the geostrategic positioning of Balochistan in the regional equation — aid is half-baked to reality. Insurgencies penetrate only if they strike at deep levels of only grievances, and Balochistan these strike deep at political marginalization, uneven resource distribution, and weak representation in federal-level decision-making. Failure by successive governments to remedy these has allowed militants to portray themselves as custodians of Baloch rights. The traditional state response has been security-focused and committed to clearance operations and security crackdown.
Intelligence-led operations remain the need, especially against hard dug-in counter-insurgent forces and professional suicide groups like the Majeed Brigade, but big-war conventional military operations have the potential to be followed by collateral killing as well as further alienation of civilians. The improved approach will have to focus on precise attacks on leadership and supply network targets wherever possible and leave civilian life intact. It demands improving coordination among security organizations like the army, Frontier Corps, Levies, and the provincial police to avoid overlapping of jurisdictions and wastage of operations. Apart from security, political outreach needs to become a characteristic of state policy in Balochistan.
It entails the revival of the dialogue process with moderate nationalist leadership, especially those already having set down arms or those retreating from overseas. Even though it may not be feasible for both sides to appear at the negotiating table, there are grounds for some form of communication with middle forces. This shall open space for political normalization and can also further isolate hardline hard-liners. Information warfare shall be an important part of this war as well.
The militants have been very successful at co-opting media — traditional media and new media — in order to position themselves as authentic struggle forces. The state narrative itself has not very frequently ever actually resonated with the local population. In an attempt to attempt to reverse this, Pakistan needs more local and inclusive messaging. Rising to the occasion, the Baloch intellectuals, civil society activists, and cultural leaders can redirect the debate away from militancy and back to peaceful activism. The socio-economic rehabilitation is also a requirement that must be fulfilled immediately. The prevailing model of Balochistan development has been largely characterized as extractive rather than participatory since the indigenous populations are mostly denied the right of empowerment through the natural resources. It stokes anger and keeps the insurgency going.
Development must be focused with engagement of the people at the grassroots level so that Baloch society’s economy does have a stake in growth. Employment, vocational training, changes in education, and development interventions initiated from the local population can help shatter the cycle of violence. Rehabilitation of former militancy through professional rehabilitation programs — reintegrating them into society and denying them the motive to rejoin insurgent ranks — is crucial as well. Strategic importance of Balochistan extends far beyond the security of Pakistan. It is a regional connectivity hub, even more so with initiatives such as CPEC, Gwadar Port, and upcoming energy pipelines connecting South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. These would necessitate Pakistan transforming Balochistan from a center of conflict to a center of opportunity.
This would necessitate not only domestic reform but regional diplomacy too. To render cross-border movement of the insurgents unfeasible, one can involve Iran and Afghanistan in co-bordering security and sharing of intelligence. Induction of Balochistan into cross-border economic corridors and trade can also give the economic underpinning of peace with sustainability. Lastly, stability in Balochistan is based on more than counterinsurgency. It recognizes the reality that effectiveness in the field, as necessary as it may be in the present, won’t fix what is a political and economic emergency. It calls on the state to distinguish itself to hear, to cooperate, and to invest in Baloch people not as recipients, but as equals. Only then, and then and only then, will the province be in harmony from periphery to very center of Pakistan’s fate.