India pursues a hegemonic foreign policy toward its smaller neighbours, while Bangladesh has adopted a compliant foreign policy in its relations with India since achieving independence in 1971. While Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and occasionally even the small Maldives resist India’s intrusive and dominating influence in the region, Bangladesh has significantly failed to counter India’s undue interference in its domestic and foreign affairs.
Mujib’s administration, along with that of his daughter, Hasina, served as exemplars of India-dominated political dynamics in South Asia. Mujib characterised India as a “friendly country,” whereas Hasina analogised the Indo-Bangladesh relationship to that of a married couple. Possibly, during the administrations of President Ziaur Rahman and Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, the nation adopted a relatively independent foreign policy towards its neighbouring power, India. This approach allowed the country to navigate regional dynamics with a degree of autonomy.
Nevertheless, following the overthrow of Hasina’s authoritarian regime in August 2024, the succeeding interim government, headed by Muhammad Yunus, has sought to establish a dignified relationship with India. This administration aims to cultivate an independent foreign policy that does not strictly adhere to directives issued by New Delhi. However, at times, the Yunus Administration either succumbs to pressure from Delhi or fails to maintain a fair and appropriate relationship with its dominant neighbour. The recent round of meetings between Khalilur Rahman, Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser, and his Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval – though it could possibly be cancelled by Dhaka – highlighted another instance in which Bangladesh did not assert itself as a sovereign entity within India’s neighbourhood.
I believe Bangladesh should not have sent its National Security Adviser to India for the Colombo Security Conclave’s (CSC) seventh summit, which I consider to be of limited significance. The CSC primarily focuses on monitoring maritime security issues among five Asian countries, including India and Bangladesh. Given the recent tensions in the Indo-Bangladesh relationship following the conviction of Prime Minister Hasina for her role in the deaths of at least 1,400 Bangladeshis (including 133 children) during the events of July-August 2024, Bangladesh should prioritise more pressing matters instead of attending a CSC meeting in New Delhi.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the way Narendra Modi and Ajit Doval communicated with Muhammad Yunus and Khalilur Rahman, respectively, during the BIMSTEC meeting in Bangkok last April was rather unprofessional. In light of these interactions, the Yunus Administration ought to have considered boycotting the CSC’s Delhi Summit to preserve its dignity and to protest India’s dominant behaviour toward Bangladesh, a smaller neighbour in South Asia. At the BIMSTEC conference held in Bangkok last April, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval informed their counterparts, Muhammad Yunus and Khalilur Rahman, that the administration led by Yunus had been acting contrary to India’s interests, under external pressure from both China and Pakistan. This development was deemed to pose a significant threat to India’s national security. Modi and Doval also expressed their concerns regarding the Yunus Administration, citing its purported actions that may be perceived as anti-Indian and its alleged promotion of anti-Hindu sentiment in Bangladesh.
The key question now is whether the Yunus Administration’s coordinated efforts to extradite Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh for the execution of the death penalty, as determined by the International Crimes Tribunal, will be successful. Another important consideration is whether India will respond positively to Bangladesh’s request. Asif Nazrul, the Law Adviser of the Yunus Administration, stated that Dhaka will once again ask New Delhi to extradite Hasina. If India denies this request, Dhaka would view that decision as detrimental to Bangladesh and its interests.
On November 18th, Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman travelled to New Delhi to meet his Indian counterpart. Both Indian and Bangladeshi media outlets reported the meeting. Rahman-Doval meetings were cordial and civil, unlike the one in Bangkok in April. Although it is officially stated that Hasina’s extradition issue was not on the table, informed sources reveal otherwise. New Delhi reportedly submitted a detailed list of requirements for Bangladesh regarding this matter. The meetings were quiet but significant, allowing an exchange of positions and expectations. There are no new Indian requirements for Bangladesh regarding the Extradition issue. New Delhi has requested special concessions from Bangladesh, which it previously communicated to Dhaka informally during the Hasina administration.
Khalilur Rahman’s response was concise and unequivocal. He informed his Indian counterpart that the Awami League was no longer a viable political entity under the Yunus Administration, and that there would be no consideration of Hasina in any discussions between India and Bangladesh. Interestingly, unlike the previous Indian arrogance and undiplomatic language displayed at the BIMSTEC meeting in Bangkok in April, this time India appeared very mild, restrained, and apparently positive. India did not present itself as a friend or protector of Hasina and her associates. Apparently, India would not mind extraditing Hasina to Bangladesh, but not for free. However, New Delhi’s demands are nearly impossible for any accountable government in Bangladesh to meet.
New Delhi is making several demands related to its relationship with Bangladesh. First, India is requesting the establishment of two special economic zones in Bangladesh to gain specific trade advantages. Second, there is a call for India to increase its diplomatic presence in Bangladesh, including by sending more Indian diplomats and establishing additional consulates. Third, India seeks expanded transit and corridor facilities through Bangladesh. Fourth, a comprehensive communication network between the two countries is needed to protect India’s commercial interests in Bangladesh. Finally, Bangladesh is expected to limit its diplomatic, industrial, and military cooperation with Pakistan and China. This includes avoiding joint drone manufacturing projects with China and preventing Chinese development near the Siliguri Corridor, particularly around the Teesta River Project and the Lalmonirhat airbase.
As previously mentioned, India’s tone has been quite soft and courteous. India has acknowledged the changing situation in Bangladesh following the overthrow of Hasina. Both India and Bangladesh are committed to maintaining a positive relationship, especially as Bangladesh’s national elections approach in February 2026. Surprisingly, India desires a strong presence of Hasina’s ruling party, the Awami League, in Bangladesh. Additionally, India has reiterated that the extradition issue cannot be resolved until an elected government is in place in Bangladesh. However, it remains uncertain whether New Delhi will honour the proposed pre-extradition agreement with Dhaka.
One could view the meetings between Doval and Rahman positively, as significant steps toward improving understanding between New Delhi and Dhaka. These discussions have ensured that diplomatic channels between the two nations remain open despite tensions. However, India must recognise that Dhaka is unwilling to negotiate the extradition of Hasina and her associates, who have been sheltered in India since August 2024, by offering any additional concessions simply for their extradition to Bangladesh.
In conclusion, the Doval-Rahman meetings reflect India’s complex and sometimes duplicitous diplomacy toward its smaller neighbour, Bangladesh. These meetings, which India may not have genuinely wanted to lead to substantial outcomes, also highlight Bangladesh’s diplomatic predicament, suggesting a certain naivety or even compliance in dealing with its more powerful and unpredictable neighbour.