
One of the major successes achieved by Indian strategic diplomacy in the last 11 years, under the Modi era, in particular, been conflict management that has hardly been noticed, talked about and analysed in global strategic circles. From domestic political perspective, the ruling party in India i.e. Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and its leaders, spokespersons and party too has failed spectacularly in putting this incredible achievement before the Indian electorate and making political dividends out of them.
A reason behind this failure could well be a tactical disinclination to publicly share this successful but critical aspect of diplomacy. At the same time, it is evident that there lies clear, well-thought out strategy behind this policy. India as the leading power in Asia and only one capable of competing with China, militarily, politically and economically (to a great extent) has specific delineated goals.
One of them, often talked about voraciously by PM Modi is a “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India), 2047. In the centenary year of Indian independence, as the leader of India, he has put on a difficult but achievable task before his administration and Indian people to make India a developed country by 2047. And in order to achieve that objective, India needs to avoid conflicts, to the extent possible, in the short to medium run. It looks similar to China which after some conflicts, internal and external, stopped getting into a direct fight, post-Vietnam debacle in late 1970s while surreptitiously following the salami slicing policy vis-à-vis India, Vietnam, Mongolia, central Asian countries and so on.
However, the incumbent government has tried avoiding conflicts while ensuring the security and national interests at the core element of diplomacy. Starting with its accession to power for the first time in May, 2014 contrary to popular expectations of following a hardline anti-Pakistan policy, the Modi government tried to showcase the event as an example of south Asian (SAARC) unity where all Heads of Government/ State were invited to attend the swearing-in-ceremony.
Modi also tried to mend ways with China and though a representative from Tibetan government-in-exile attended the event, that was deliberately maintained on a low key. He developed personal chemistry with Xi Jinping, both met and visited each other and ensured a big momentum in bilateral political and economic relationship, resulting in tremendous surge in trade relationship.
However, as the two countries found themselves competing for political and economic power on a global scale, conflicts obviously arose. In 2017 when India found China once again using its salami slicingstrategy to make inroads into Bhutan, posing a direct threat to its security on the strategic Siliguri Corridor, it got into the way and put its forces directly against the Chinese. It seems Jinping and PLA both did not anticipate Indian reaction and found the situation clumsy.
Though the 73-day Doklam crisis somehow ended peacefully but Chinese leadership found it difficult to swallow the debacle.It waited for revenge and in 2020 Galwan Valley of Ladakh skirmish happened, leading to the death of 20 Indian and 44 PLA soldiers (unofficial sources). It led to a prolonged eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, multiple standoffs between two armies over a period of four years. Again however, Modi government while ensuring a settlement, forced withdrawal of Chinese forces and status quo ante on almost all disputed points, managed the conflict quite effectively and remarkably without getting into a full-fledged war that neither sides wished or prepared for.
The incessant increase of Chinese economic, political and diplomatic power, courtesy its evolution as the global manufacturing hub and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), further strengthened its Pearl of Stringsstrategy in the south Asian region over its nearest rival, India. Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives, all neighbours have had their political or diplomatic spats with India. But Modi government followed a policy of accommodative diplomacy,supporting and helping neighbours, financially and politically.
The extraordinary gesture of helping out Sri Lanka and Maldives in particular supporting them out of their debt crisis, further reinforced their belief and bond with India. By maintaining a distance from internal politics of Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh, Modi government was able to contain bilateral differences to manageable limits while ensuring China’s influence do not overwhelm India’s interests there.
In Afghanistan, the abrupt withdrawal of US forces by Biden administration in September 2021 made situation difficult for nations in the vicinity, the west and India. Accepting a radical, unpredictable, anti-democratic Taliban was very dicey for India. It took its time, started with low-level engagements with Taliban in third-countries and then in Afghanistan, gradually raising its contacts with the highest levels in the administration. With Pakistan playing a duplicitous role vis-à-vis Taliban-led administration, India gradually spread its wings and now seems to have established a highly functional working relationship with ruling establishment in Afghanistan.
One of the major concerns from Indian diplomatic perspective has been dealings with Pakistan. With bilateral relations continue to be tense and unpredictable since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, mostly over issues like Kashmir and terrorism, handling relations with its western neighbour, continues to be a big challenge for Indian diplomats.
In the Modi-era since 2014, PM Modi himself has put in huge personal efforts in stabilising relations with Pakistan. It started with an invite to Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistan PM to attend the government formation in May, 2014 which was followed by a one-to-one interaction between two Prime Ministers. A few months later, while returning from a foreign trip, Modi made an unscheduled stopover in Lahore to wish PM Sharif personally, with an intent to develop personal chemistry with Pakistani leader. It was evidently aimed at enhancing congenial bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and all indications suggest, Nawaz Sharif responded positively that resulted in a rare cordiality till he remained in power.
Subsequently however relations with Pakistan started deteriorating with its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), getting into the act. A terror attack on Indian Air Force (IAF)’s Pathankot Air Base took place but contrary to expectations, Modi government shared intelligence with Pakistan, even allowed its team (comprising Army/ISI officials) to visit the base as part of joint investigation, as suggested by it.
It was really unthinkable specially, coming from someone like Modi who has been villainised the world over by interested political groups, organisations and some countries as anti-Muslim and Pakistan hater. Trying his best for a peaceful co-existence with Pakistan, stabilising conflicts to a manageable level and peaceful diplomacy, however were pursued with greater national interests of India in mind, i.e. a period of peace and stability will aid in the rise of India, economically and militarily.
What followed was a complete betrayal from Pakistani side. Its army/ISI run government, foreign policy and dictate diplomacy. The Pathankot terror attack joint investigation failed to make headway and Indian diplomats realised that Pakistan will not change. The next terror attacks on Uri Army base and Pulwama, killing 40 paramilitary soldiers, however, saw a dramatic change of tactics and strategy by India.
Uri attack was followed with a surgical strike by Indian Army commandos, deep inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir terror camps. It successfully eliminated scores of hardcore terrorists, trained by Pakistan Army, ready to be infiltrated into Indian part of Kashmir, to carry out further terror attacked.
Similarly, Pulwama terror attack was followed was deep air strikes in Balakot region of Pakistan, again killing a number of terrorists. Both attacks by Indian forces, are important since for the first time in the long 7-decades of troubled Indo-Pak relationship, it showed a determined Indian intent to hit back against Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, inside their territories. Such attacks were unprecedented since beginning 1990s, Pakistan has been using the nuclear blackmail, repeatedly intimidating India to use nuclear weapons if it dares to cross the Line of Control (LOC), the de-facto India-Pakistan border.
A crucial aspect of these attacks however, was that immediately after surprise attacks, the military/diplomatic establishment from New Delhi went public and declared that attacks were limited, aimed at terrorists/their infrastructure only and not against Pakistan or its military. It clearly showed intent of the Modi government that it was not keen to precipitate and escalate crisis, objective was to send message to Pakistani terrorists and its establishment (Pakistan Army, not Government) and avoid getting into a full-fledged war.
The barbaric killing of 26 Hindu tourists at Pahalgam, in Indian state of Kashmir in April again was extremely provocative and hostile act. The Operation Sindoor initiated by Modi government to avenge killings by hitting out at the top leadership of terrorists like Lashkar-i-Taiba, JMI and others again was planned to be a limited attack but its scope was expanded.
For the first time, Indian forces reached deep and hit inside Pakistan territories, their major cities Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, military installations including 11 major air bases, in addition to terrorists’ infrastructures. Once again, as part of India’s conflict management, after initial attack on terror bases/centres, Indian diplomats reached out and informed their Pakistani counterparts that their limited objective was done and over. It was not interested in continuing attacks on civilian or military infrastructure.
However, the internal dynamics of Pakistani establishment led by its General Asim Munir, tried to use this opportunity to enhance its power and hit out at Indian military and civilian bases, leading to the 88-hour conflict that however, ended suddenly on 10th May after Pakistani Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) called up its Indian counterpart and requested a ceasefire that India after communication from top leaderships of US, Saudi Arabia, acceded to.
All such conflicts in diplomatic, political and military domains that India has faced in the last 11 years, have been resolved with one common factor. India has tried to use engagement as a means for consultation, negotiation, persuasion and finally limited strategic and military options to achieve its objective. And that objective has been to protect and promote national interests while continuing its economic progress. Finally, its response has always been measured, limited and innovative, something that opponent has failed to anticipate. India thus has come a long way from its earlier diplomatic roadmap of ‘request, restraint and complain’ to ‘assert, authority and outcome’ in recent times.
