Doval-Rahman meeting on the sidelines of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) in New Delhi
The quiet, undramatic meeting between India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his Bangladeshi counterpart Dr. Khalilur Rahman on the sidelines of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) in New Delhi on November 19 may have gone unremarked in the Western media, but in the South Asian capital cities, it has unleashed a whole host of predictions, apprehensions, and curiosities. The first meaningful contact between India and Bangladesh since the July Revolution that ousted Sheikh Hasina from power on August 5, 2024, came as Dhaka filed a formal extradition request for the former prime minister under the existing bilateral treaty following the International Crimes Tribunal’s sentencing of Hasina to death. Against this combustible political and diplomatic backdrop, the bilateral meeting, which remained focused on the CSC’s agenda but was open on the key issue of bilateral relations, has been sharply dissected, second-guessed, and scrutinized from both sides of the border.
Rahman’s delegation met Doval and his team on the eve of the seventh NSA-level CSC meeting, which brings together India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Mauritius to discuss maritime, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and regional security issues. Given the highly charged political environment on both sides of the Indian border in recent weeks and months, no official statement or readout from the two delegations on their closed-door talks could have escaped the conclusion that this was a meeting of great bilateral interest masquerading as a multilateral one. The restrained, formal, and factual language of the Bangladesh High Commission press release on Rahman’s meetings with Doval and other Indian officials itself signaled that Bangladesh had a bilateral message for New Delhi but did not want to disclose the exact contours of the discussion publicly. A specific agenda item, the extradition of Hasina and her former home minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, also sentenced to death by the ICT on November 17, added even more substance to bilateral meetings that were careful to make no mention of it.
Bangladesh foreign ministry spokesman Abdullah al Islam made clear Dhaka’s position and expectations with a statement on the eve of the verdict, hours after the ICT sentenced Hasina to death. The foreign ministry spokesperson called on India to “immediately” extradite Hasina and Kamal to Bangladesh, urging New Delhi to honor its legal treaty obligations. The spokesperson, however, did not indicate whether the Bangladesh government would still pursue this option in the event of an appeal by Hasina’s defense team, which was reported as likely immediately after the November 17 sentencing. India’s response to the request was diplomatic to the point of saying nothing. Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi carefully avoided directly answering questions from Indian and foreign journalists on the extradition issue, stating instead that India had “consistently” supported a “peaceful, democratic and stable Bangladesh.” Bagchi added that this was in India’s “national interest,” which is true, but did not take the opportunity to address either the specific question about Hasina or the broader issue of how New Delhi might recalibrate relations with the interim government.
New Delhi’s silence may have tactical value if the goal is to test the Bangladesh government’s intentions and future plans. With the Election Commission of Bangladesh (ECB) yet to announce the date of the next elections in 2026 and the current debate among political actors and civil society over whether to hold a national referendum, it is unclear whether the Indian government should act too quickly. It is also possible that New Delhi has decided not to extradite Hasina to Bangladesh until it can better determine the political field in which it will have to operate after the fall of the Awami League. India’s behavior over the last several months has reinforced a long-held belief in Bangladesh that the Indian state made a significant mistake by aligning itself so closely with one political party for so long, at the expense of building bridges with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and other political actors. The Doval–Rahman meeting on November 19 at least hints that New Delhi may finally be willing to accept Dhaka’s demand for a relationship based on equality and reciprocity.
The meeting between Doval and Rahman has been labeled as historic by Bangladesh Brigadier General Md Manzur Qader (retired), a Dhaka-based expert on bilateral relations. Still, even before the event, New Delhi had signaled a desire for a reset in Dhaka. During a press conference on November 18, the day before Rahman met with Doval, Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Bagchi once again focused on Bangladesh, calling on Dhaka to respect India’s concerns. At the same press conference, Bagchi’s counterpart Jatindra Choudhury, the additional secretary for international organizations in the MEA, added that India expects Bangladesh to respect its “territorial integrity and sovereignty.” In what has become a remarkably blunt assessment of relations with India from a Dhaka government, which, after all, holds the keys to the relationship with New Delhi, Choudhury then said that India has an interest in both Bangladeshi political parties being able to operate freely. It may not be much of a stretch to see, in these comments, a subtext that India’s relationship with Bangladesh should be more equal.
The Doval–Rahman meeting thus sets the stage for the months ahead in one regard, but in another, the cards remain far from fully dealt. New Delhi’s dilemma is that Hasina has been living in India for months and has held several political interviews in recent weeks. The Bangladesh foreign ministry summoned India’s deputy high commissioner on November 18 to “regret” the interviews and question India’s behavior. To many Bangladeshis, the protest was weak, reinforcing a view in Dhaka that the bilateral relationship has long been tilted too far in India’s favor. New Delhi’s first public response, however, avoided any direct reference to the extradition treaty, let alone the specific request from Dhaka. It is possible that the MEA in New Delhi decided that there is simply too much uncertainty to speak on this issue and that the Indian government will wait to see if Hasina’s sentence is actually carried out.
Whatever the answers to these questions, New Delhi’s engagement in the CSC this week is significant in terms of Dhaka’s ongoing attempts to diversify its foreign relations. Bangladesh has been in constant diplomatic contact with the United States, the European Union, and the Gulf Cooperation Council over the past few weeks and months. Some of this outreach has been on the Rohingya issue, which is of direct interest to Myanmar. Still, other moves include public engagement on Myanmar-Myanmar roads as a humanitarian corridor and an intensified focus on Bangladesh’s role as a “gateway” to South and Southeast Asia. At a time when the Pakistan Navy is opening a high-level channel to Bangladesh with new visits in late November, including an engagement with Inter-Services Intelligence Director General (ISI) Nadeem Anjum, New Delhi will be watching every diplomatic move Bangladesh makes very closely. If Dhaka can reach out to a diverse set of interlocutors, including Myanmar and Pakistan, there is no reason why it cannot do the same with India.
India’s interest in Bangladesh goes well beyond the fact that Dhaka is its neighbor. Bangladesh is critically important to New Delhi as part of its effort to contain Chinese and Pakistani influence in South Asia. If Bangladesh adopts a more nationalistic, independent stance on a range of issues, that could change the nature of this relationship. It is in New Delhi’s own interest to find a way to engage with Dhaka that does not produce a backlash or resentment in the short term. The present relationship does not serve either Indian or Dhaka’s interests, which is why the Doval–Rahman meeting on the sidelines of the CSC this week was so important, as the first official meeting between India and Bangladesh since the change of government in Dhaka in August. By all accounts, both sides were positive and constructive, and this is the right way to move forward.